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I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
Change is the only constant in today’s global economy. Countries that are flexible and 
prepared to undertake necessary change are more likely to grow and prosper in this challenging 
economic environment. The Caribbean economies were founded on trade and exchange. As a 
result, global commodity shocks and the need for domestic adjustment are not new to the region. 
In spite of this, though, much of the Caribbean production and exports are still based on 
preferential access to markets. This is so whether it is sugar, bananas and rum to the European 
Union (EU) market under the Lomé Convention; beef, rum and tobacco to the United States 
under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI); or a range of commodities to Canada under 
CARIBCAN, (notable exception being textiles, clothing and footwear).
Trade liberalization, market opening and access stipulations by developed countries in the 
1990s mean that the era of preferences may be fast coming to a close. The market is now the 
major shaper of the prospects and fortunes of countries. Moreover, the market is founded on 
competition that rewards efficiency and productivity. This means that the competitiveness of a 
nation’s firms is an increasingly important determinant of its ability to generate wealth in 
international trade. Competitive industries reinforce the virtuous link between international 
trade, domestic growth and employment.
The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) with a mandate to regulate a liberal 
trading regime means that Caribbean manufacturers and other producers will have to play by the 
rules of the game. Protectionist policies that have sheltered less efficient producers are under 
attack. The regional manufacturing and agro-industrial sectors will have to compete on their 
own merit. In addition, with changing trade rules regulated by international arbitration bodies, 
competition policy would provide the basis for ensuring that firms play by the rules. Such rules 
seek to ensure that firms are not engaged in anti-competitive practices, such as illegal mergers 
and acquisitions, dumping and resale price practices. As an adjunct to this, the elements of 
industrial policy will fall increasingly under the microscope of such dispute settlement bodies.
This study examines the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector in the Caribbean 
with a focus on four countries. The countries selected are Dominica, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. These countries are deemed to be fairly 
representative of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), as a whole, in terms of the structure 
and market performance of the sectors. The study arose out of the recognition that the sectors 
have performed well below expectations in the past. The paper is divided into the following
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sections: Section 2 defines competitiveness and examines its foundations; Section 3 
provides an analysis of the structure of the regional manufacturing sector and the factors 
that influence the competitiveness of the sector; Section 4 provides an indicator of 
manufacturing export competitiveness; Section 5 outlines some policies for strengthening 
the competitiveness of CARICOM manufacturers; and Section 6 draws some 
conclusions.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF COM PETITIVENESS THEORY REVISITED
There is no standard definition of competitiveness. Neither is there a cornucopia 
recipe for firms seeking to achieve it. There is much broad agreement, however, on what 
competitiveness entails and the conditions and policies necessary for achieving it. At this 
point, a few crude stylized principles about competitiveness are useful for guiding 
analysis of the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector in the selected countries.
First, international competitiveness has its foundation in the theory of 
comparative advantage. The view of some competitiveness pundits that the theory of 
comparative advantage is defunct is therefore fallacious1. Like comparative advantage, 
the concept of competitiveness strives to explain why the gains from international trade 
differ among countries. However, while comparative advantage places greater emphasis 
on why nations trade; competitiveness seeks to account for why some firms (and nations) 
benefit more than others from trade.
Competitiveness is a more recent concept, which has become more in vogue as 
growth in international trade has outpaced growth in world Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). World output grew by about 3.6 per cent per annum between 1970 and 1997, 
whereas, world trade increased by roughly 5.8 per cent per year for the same period.2 
Moreover, some competitiveness advocates tend to focus heavily on international 
competition among nations and the winners and losers in this ‘struggle’. This has led 
some economists3 to attack this conceptual approach as ill-founded or misleading.
The second stylized principle is that international competitiveness is a concept 
that is relevant primarily at the level of the firm and not so much at the national level. 
This distinction is important, because it is firms or nations that compete for international 
market share and profitability, rather than the nation itself. Competitiveness as it relates 
to nations refers to the macroeconomic and socio-cultural and institutional environment. 
This environment can either facilitate or retard the competitiveness of the domestic or 
international firms that operate within the country’s borders.
1 The increasing mobility of capital and technology is usually advanced as undermining the theory 
of comparative advantage.
2 International Monetary Fund Annual Report 1998.
3 See Krugman, Paul. “Competitiveness: Myth or Dangerous Obsession”, Foreign Affairs, 1994.
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The third stylized principle, which arises out of the two previous ones is that 
competitiveness relates primarily to the degree of microeconomic productivity and 
efficiency at the level of the firm and the strength of the supporting macroeconomic and 
institutional environment of a country.
Ila . Definitions of and types of competitiveness
A landmark definition of competitiveness was offered in the Report of the 
President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness (1984) in the United States. 
According to this report, competitiveness is the extent to which a nation can, under free 
and fair market conditions, produce goods that can gain international market share and 
increase the real incomes of producers. Although this definition refers to the 
competitiveness of the nation, it is understood that the nation’s firms are the producers 
that are seeking to gain profitable market share.
The World Competitiveness Yearbook 19964 takes a systems approach in looking 
at competitiveness. The Yearbook defines competitiveness as the “ability of a country to 
create added value and increase national wealth by managing assets and processes, 
attractiveness and aggressiveness, globality and proximity, and by integrating these 
relationships into an economic and social model” . Assets and processes refer to the 
resources and production processes of the country. Attractiveness means that the country 
creates an environment that encourages inflows of foreign direct investment and other 
partnerships, while aggressiveness is the push to enter foreign markets by investing 
overseas. The economy globality refers to internationally traded commodities, while 
proximity means traditional primarily non-tradable output.
Meanwhile, a report on the competitiveness of Australia’s information industries 
notes that a firm is considered to be competitive if it can hold or increase its market share, 
while making an acceptable return on its investment. Competitiveness, therefore, is 
reflected by market share and profitability benchmarks.
IIb. Types of competitiveness
Since competitiveness is a goal of the firm, it is influenced by the strategic 
interface between the firm and the market place. Theory and empirical evidence suggest 
two broad types of competitiveness. These are: competitiveness based on costs or pricing 
of the product (price competitiveness); and competitiveness based on product quality, 
design, innovation and skill intensity and flexibility (quality competitiveness). Economic 
history seems to suggest that as countries grow and develop, there is a tendency to 
increase the relative share of quality competitive commodities that they produce. Strong 
recent evidence for this has been borne out in the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs)
See The World Competitiveness Yearbook, 1996, International Institute for Management 
Development (IMD), 1996.
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of Asia, which moved away from more resource intensive activities into high value 
added, high tech electronics, information technology, pharmaceuticals and other high 
quality activities. The question, then, is whether competitiveness is path dependent. The 
jurors are not clear on this, though, and some economists argue that competitiveness is 
dynamic and can be created.5
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
IN SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
The Caribbean manufacturing and agro-industrial sectors were founded on import 
substitution industrialization. Nobel Laureate Sir Arthur Lewis’ model of 
‘Industrialization by Invitation’ provided the strategy for the development of the sector. 
The model recognized the need for a vibrant manufacturing sector to diversify the 
economy and to promote growth and employment. The employment factor was rather 
important for Lewis, given that Caribbean societies were deemed surplus labour societies, 
with high levels of unemployment. Consequently, import competing manufacturing was 
regarded as a means of exploiting economies of scale, with the use of cheap surplus 
labour. Economists, notably Paul Krugman,6 have recognized the importance of the 
nexus between surplus labour, imperfect competition and economies of scale in providing 
the impetus to manufacturing activity in developing countries.
On the advice of Lewis and others, governments provided a number of incentives 
to attract foreign direct investment in manufacturing activities. These included the 
provision of basic infrastructure, such as industrial estates, roads, water and electricity. In 
addition, manufacturers were allowed duty free imports of plant and equipment. 
Companies were also allowed tax concessions for up to 15 years and accelerated 
depreciation allowances to boost investment.
Over time, three types of manufacturing activities have been dominant in the 
region. These are import substitution industries, the enclave sector and agro-processing 
activities. Among these were textile manufacturing, food processing, electronic 
components and household appliances.
However, these industries operated very much on the fringe and failed to capture 
any important foothold in foreign markets. Conceptually, aspects of Lewis’ model were 
sound. Structural and operational constraints limited its impact, however. The import 
substitution industrialization had a particularly negative impact on competitiveness. 
Protection measures including tax exemptions, tariffs and quotas stifled competition and
Shifts in competitiveness could result from many factors including the discovery of new resources, 
the accumulation of resources, acquisition of new technological skills, new production processes, 
innovations, etc.
Krugman, Paul. "Toward a Counter-revolution in Development Theory", in Proceedings of the 
World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1992.
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strengthened unproductive, declining industries. Further, protectionist policies resulted in 
the allocation of credit to uncompetitive activities. Consequently, after 40 years of 
attempting to create a vibrant manufacturing sector, it remains weak and inflexible.
The following sections will focus on the manufacturing sector in Dominica, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago.
IIIa. Dominica
Dominica, like most of her Caribbean counterparts, produces relatively simple, 
low value manufactured goods. The sector revolves around the processing of agricultural 
products, enclave industries and the assembly of plastic and metal goods. Agro-industry 
includes food and beverage production using a variety of raw material inputs, such as 
coconuts, citrus, other fruits and animal feed production. This subsector also produces 
beer, rum, soft drinks, vinegar, pepper sauces, seamoss, vanilla extracts, patchouli and 
bay oils. Light manufacturing generally geared towards import substitution in the early 
stages became more oriented towards export markets at a later stage. The more important 
of these light manufacturers include garments, timber products, handicrafts, galvanized 
metal and other metal products. Two manufacturers, the Dominica Coconut Products 
Limited which was taken over by Colgate Palmolive in 1994, and Bello Products have 
performed well over the years. Actually the Dominica Coconut Products’ soaps, lotions 
and creams have become household toiletries in the region and have performed relatively 
well in the extraregional market. Bello Products specializes in the production of bay rum 
lotion, condiments, pepper sauce, fruit juice concentrates and jellies. Bello Products has 
also attained some success with its incursion into the export market. Critical to the 
success of these subsectors has been the niche market export strategy. This entails the 
targeting of a specialised segment in the export market that rewards product 
differentiation and cultural products with special qualities, such as taste, aroma or 
rareness.
Table 1 below shows that the contribution of the manufacturing sector to 
Dominica’s real GDP averaged US$10.3 million between 1989 and 1993. Between 1994 
and 1998, average manufacturing value added rose slightly to US$10.9 million. 
Moreover, the average percentage contribution of the manufacturing sector to total output 
fell marginally from 7.4 per cent between 1989 and 1993 to 7.0 per cent between 1994 
and 1998. Growth in manufacturing real output also slipped marginally from an average 
of 10.3 per cent between 1989 and 1998 to 10.2 per cent between 1994 and 1998. In 
spite of commendable growth over the last decade, the low base from which this growth 
began means that the contribution of the sector to real output is still small and compares 
unfavourably with average value added contributions of over 22 per cent for agriculture, 
11 per cent for wholesale and retail trade and 18.0 per cent for government services. 
However, this is more a reflection of the structure of economy which is primarily 
agricultural based. The importance of the banana subsector, for instance, is underscored 
by average growth of 18.3 per cent in the crops subsector. Nevertheless, the relative 
importance of agriculture and manufacturing could change even more over time, if
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manufacturing continues to register vibrant growth and if the fallout from the WTO 
ruling on the EU banana regime adversely affects Dominica’s banana production.
Table 1
Selected indicators of real Gross Domestic Product by economic activity
for Dominica 1989-1998




































2. Mining and 
Quarrying
1.1 1.3 0.8 0.8 94.6 81.4
3. Manufacturing 10.3 10.9 7.4 7 10.3 10.2
4. Electricity and 
Water
4.4 5.8 3.1 3.7 25.3 20.1
5. Construction 10.3 13.1 7.4 8.4 10.5 8.2
6. Wholesale and 
Retail Trade
15.6 19.4 11.2 12.4 6.7 5.6
7. Hotels and 
Restaurants
3.1 4.2 2.2 2.7 43.9 24.8
8. Transport 13.2 15.7 9.5 10 8.2 6.8
9. Communications 10.3 14.7 7.3 9.4 11.2 8
10. Banks and 
Insurance
16.6 19.3 11.9 12.3 6.5 5.5
11. Real Estate and 
Housing
5.1 5.5 3.6 3.5 20.2 18.9
12. Government 
Services
25.8 27.2 18.5 17.4 4 3.8
13. Other Services 1.5 2 1.1 1.3 71.2 56.8
14. Less Imputed 
Service Charge
11.9 14.7 8.5 9.4 10 7.2
15. TOTAL 139.2 156.5 100 100 0.8 0.7
Source: ECLAC, based on national data
Per capita manufacturing value added (per capita MVA) of Dominica’s 
manufacturing industry increased from $78 in 1980 to $155 in 19977. This compares 
with a movement from $694 to $641 in Latin America, from $161 to $290 in developing 
countries as a whole, and from $3,708 to $4,802 in developed countries. Therefore, in 
1980, developing countries per capita manufacturing value added was two times that of
7 See UNIDO Country Industrial Statistics at www.unido.org/data/stats/showstat.cfm?cc=DMI-a
7
Dominica, and by 1997, it had fallen but only marginally to 1.87. Similarly, real average 
per capita MVA grew by 8.6 per cent a year in Dominica between 1970 and 1980, but 
slipped badly to grow by only 0.1 per cent between 1990 and 1997. The comparable 
growth rates for Latin America were 3.2 per cent and 1.3 per cent, while for developing 
countries and developed countries they were 4.5 per cent and 5.5 per cent and 2.0 per 
cent and 1.3 per cent, respectively. These figures indicate that growth in real average 
annual per capita MVA declined in Dominica in contrast with the performance of 
developing countries as a whole, where MVA increased from 4.5 per cent to 5.5 per cent.
IIIa.1 Productivity in Dominica
The unavailability of labour and capital cost statistics prevent the 
calculation of indices of productivity for the Dominican manufacturing industry. 
However, site visits and anecdotal information on labour and other input costs relative to 
worker output suggest that weak and slow growth in productivity is an important drag on 
the competitiveness of the country’s manufacturers. Indications are that productivity 
growth in the Dominican manufacturing sector is lower than the average for medium to 
fast growing developing economies. Further, it is expected that like most other 
Caribbean countries, Dominica’s productivity growth has lagged significantly behind that 
of the fast growing export-oriented NICs of Asia.
A number of reasons could be advanced for the sluggish productivity 
performance of the Dominican manufacturing sector. The more important of these 
include: the use of inappropriate and out-dated equipment and technology, low level of 
skills of the workforce, an inward-oriented import substitution industrial strategy with the 
export thrust coming relatively late and weak infrastructure and institutional support 
systems. The low technology base directly impeded the capacity to expand the quantity 
and quality of output in the sector. This problem has been compounded by inadequate 
technical and managerial competence.
Moreover, the lack of a serious commitment to outward-oriented, export 
based strategies has led to production and marketing systems that are substantially below 
internationally accepted best practices. Private sector failure at the production level is 
also aggravated by public sector failure with respect to the provision of infrastructure and 
institutional support systems. The geography of the island and inadequate road network 
result in high transportation costs. High electricity and telecommunications charges also 
raise the overhead costs burden of manufacturers. In addition, institutional weaknesses 
relating to the procedures for establishing a business, legal and customs clearance 
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Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing
15.7 11.4 26.5 33.4 -21.4 3.7
Sugarcane 6.9 5.3 12.1 15.6 -18.9 3.8
Rice 1.1 1.3 1.9 3.7 -19.5 16.4
Other crops 3.3 1.7 5.4 4.9 -26.5 1.6
Livestock 1.3 0.7 1.8 1.9 -30.6 7.2
Forestry 1.3 1.5 2.2 4.5 -0.1 -0.9
Fishing 1.8 0.9 2.9 2.8 -26.5 2.9
Mining and Quarrying 5.3 3.8 9.2 11.4 -14.7 1.1
Bauxite and Alumina 4.2 1.1 7.1 3.3 -26.7 -14.6
Other 1.3 1.1 2.8 3.3 19 -23.2
Manufacturing 7.3 2.6 12.1 7.9 -24.6 -10.7
Sugar Manufacturing 2.2 0.3 3.8 0.9 -18.8 -20
Rice Milling 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.2 -19.6 -20
Other 4.7 0.4 7.5 1.4 -27.5 -20
Engineering and 
Construction
4.3 2.7 6.9 8 -23.2 5.1
Services 27.7 13.3 44.7 39.4 -27.1 0.5
Distribution 5 2.7 8.3 8 -24.6 1
Transport and 
Communications
5 2.8 8.1 8.1 -25.2 2.2
Rent of Dwellings 1.1 0.6 1.8 1.7 -27.4 2.1
Government 10.8 4.3 17 12.8 -30 -1.7
Financial Services 3.5 1.8 5.6 5.4 -25.6 1.9
Other Services 2.2 1.2 3.6 3.4 -25.7 1.4
TOTAL GDP 60.5 33.9 100 100 -24 0.6
Source: ECLAC, based on national data
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Manufacturing activity in Guyana is largely resource based, in keeping with the 
notion of specialization based on the factor proportions model of comparative advantage8. 
In earlier times, the sector was driven primarily by public investment. However, with 
structural adjustment, liberalization and trade reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, private 
sector participation has increased commensurately. With respect to specific activities, 
manufacturing entails the traditional sugar production and rice milling, the production of 
food and beverages, agro-industries, forest-based products and mechanical parts and 
machinery. Similar to most CARICOM countries, the food and beverage subsector is one 
of the more dynamic areas of activity. Activity in the subsector is focused on the 
production of breakfast cereals, biscuits, sauces, jams and jellies. Beverage production 
includes the brewing of beer, distillation of rum, and the production of soft drinks. The 
Company Banks DIH is the leading producer in the food and beverage subsector, 
producing Banks beer, soft drinks and a range of cereals and other food products.
The government has promoted the furniture making industry to strengthen value 
added in the forestry sector. This is viewed as a means of making more optimal use of 
Guyana’s abundant forestry resources. Furniture-making firms, such as Shiva Wood 
working, Precision Wood Working and Liana Cane Interiors, have been struggling 
against great odds to develop viable furniture-making operations. Shiva Woodworking 
has used the United Nations Industrial Organization’s (UNIDO) assistance to good effect, 
to restructure the plant, undertake management training and to standardize its furniture. 
Liana canes produce the special, relatively exotic liana type furniture (somewhat like, but 
better than wicker). This firm with the right type of support could readily capture a high- 
end niche market in export markets.
Guyana has also ventured into the production of some machine parts and capital 
goods for the sugar and rice subsectors. This involves the production of punt barges for 
transportation in the sugar industry and machine parts for repairs and maintenance in the 
sugar and rice industries. One of these firms, IDI Engineering, uses state-of-the-art 
computerized production systems and seems to be relatively efficient and productive by 
international standards.
Other activities include extraction and processing of the heart of the manacled 
palm, shrimp and fish processing, largely for export, production of pharmaceuticals at the 
Guyana Pharmaceuticals Corporation and small-scale production of marble products.
Table 2 above indicates that the contribution of the manufacturing sector in 
Guyana to real GDP, averaged US$7.3 million between 1989 and 1993, and US$2.6 
million between 1994 and 1998. Manufacturing value added in Guyana is quite small, 
even by the standards of small developing countries with populations of around 1 million. 
Further, the table shows that as a percentage of GDP, real manufacturing output which 
averaged 12.1 per cent between 1989 and 1993, slipped to 7.9 per cent between 1994 and 
1998. Even more remarkable is the rate of decline of the Guyanese manufacturing sector. 
Between 1990 and 1993, the value of manufacturing production contracted by a startling
8 Under this model, also known as the Heckscher-Ohlin model, comparative advantage is based on 
the relative abundance of factors of production.
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24.6 per cent, and continued to decline by 10.7 per cent between 1994 and 1998. Of the 
subsectors, the value of sugar output declined by 19.4 per cent between 1989 and 1998, 
while value added in the rice milling contracted by a 19.6 per cent over the same period. 
Other manufacturing including the production of furniture, beverages and 
pharmaceuticals slipped by 23.8 per cent over the decade. The contraction in 
manufacturing value added in Guyana in the 1990s reflected the impact of a type of 
Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ in the aftermath of economic reforms and 
restructuring. From the 1960s to 1980s, Guyana was a classic case of the statist 
economy. Economic activity was concentrated in the public sector, the trade regime was 
extremely protectionist with high tariffs and quota barriers, price and exchange controls. 
Economic reforms in the 1990s resulted in a more open, market-oriented trade regime, 
with lower tariffs and the encouragement of foreign direct investment. The natural 
consequence of this has been a shake out in the manufacturing sector, with inefficient, 
marginal domestic firms going out of business and those that survive having to adjust to 
meet the new market requirements. This has led inevitably to a contraction in output in 
the short to medium term as firms adjust. However, it is anticipated that in the longer 
term firms would become more competitive as they come to terms with operating in a 
market-based environment.
In Guyana, per capita manufacturing value added contracted by over 49 per cent, 
from $120 in 1980 to $61 in 19979. This compares unfavourably with a decline of 12.5 
per cent for Latin America and growth of 80.1 per cent and 29.5 per cent, for developing 
and developed countries. Meanwhile, Guyana’s real average annual per capita MVA 
grew by 4.6 per cent between 1970 and 1980, but rose slightly to 4.8 per cent between 
1990 and 1997. This compares somewhat favourably with growth rates of 3.2 per cent 
and 1.3 per cent for Latin America, 4.5 per cent and 5.5 per cent for developing countries 
and 2.0 per cent and 1.3 per cent for developed countries.
IIIb.1 Productivity
The productivity malaise in the Guyanese manufacturing sector is the 
result of factors that are similar to those for Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
and other CARICOM countries. However, there are some peculiarities that exist for 
Guyana. These relate to the extent to which the State controlled the economy in the past 
and the pace at which the market is opening. Even though Guyana’s labour costs are 
comparatively lower than most other CARICOM and many developing economies, this 
advantage was generally offset by relatively weak productivity. An overwhelming 
majority of manufacturers from site visits cited worker productivity as an important 
constraint on business performance.
Guyana’s productivity problem is the end result of a confluence of factors. 
Important among these are the brain drain, low level technology, inadequate capital, lack 
of spare and replacement parts and poor plant maintenance. Over time, the brain drain
9 See UNIDO Pg 12 op cit.
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has depleted the human capital base of the country. The loss of skilled technical and 
managerial expertise, and the shortage of funds for acquiring foreign expertise have acted 
as major constraints to productivity growth in Guyanese manufacturing. This has 
resulted in many plants operating below optimum production capacity, thereby wasting 
resources. In addition, the use of rudimentary technology and the poor state of repair and 
maintenance of plants have hindered productivity growth. This problem was particularly 
acute during the height of the statist command of the economy, and still affects a number 
of manufacturing plants.
IIIb.2 Real effective exchange ra te  developments in Guyana
Graph 1 below shows the pattern of the Real Effective Exchange Rates 
(REERs) for Guyana for the period 1985 to 1998. Guyana’s REERs declined from 291.2 
in 1985 to 142.2 in 1987. The REER appreciated somewhat between 1987 and 1988, but 
depreciated steadily until 1991, after which there was a general appreciation. Changes in 
the REERs suggest that Guyana’s price competitiveness improved broadly up to 1991, 
after which its price competitiveness relative to its more important trading partners 
worsened.
G raph 1
Real Effective Exchange Rates for Guyana 
1985-1998
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12
IIIc. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Table 3
Selected indicators of real Gross Domestic Product by economic activity for 























Agriculture 32.6 26.4 18.8 13.4 1.3 -0.3
Bananas 15.1 7.6 8.7 3.9 4.3 -2
Mining and Quarrying 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.4 11.0 2.3
Manufacturing 15.6 16.2 9 8.2 -0.9 -0.4
Electricity and Water 8.4 10.9 4.8 5.5 5.2 5.9
Construction 16.7 20.7 9.5 10.4 6.7 5.6
Wholesale and Retail 20.8 29.6 11.9 15.0 9.0 6.3
Hotels and Restaurants 4.0 4.9 2.3 2.5 8.6 1.3
Transport 22.3 26.5 12.8 13.4 3.9 5.5
Communications 12.9 16.6 7.4 8.4 8.6 5.5
Banks and Insurance 13.1 17.0 7.5 8.6 3.7 7.0
Real Estate & Housing 4.8 5.5 2.7 2.8 4.4 2.0
Government Services 27.5 33 15.8 16.7 4.6 2.6
Other Services 3.1 3.3 1.8 1.7 1.3 2.0
Less imputed Service 
Charge
9.9 13.3 5.7 6.7 4.0 7.7
Total GDP 174.3 198 100 100 2.7 3.1
Source: ECLAC, based on national data
Manufacturing in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines comprises resource-based 
activities and foreign enclave assembly and production. The food, beverage and tobacco 
subsector, especially the brewery, has been fairly dynamic over time, accounting for over 
60 per cent of value added in manufacturing. Agro-industrial activities include flour and 
animal feed production and fruit processing. Other areas of activity include the 
production of textiles and wearing apparel, paper products, furniture making, cardboard 
boxes, galvanize sheets and electrical parts and machinery. Generally, apart from the 
food and beverage and flour and animal feed subsectors, the other areas of activity have 
not performed well. Their performance has been negatively affected by the small scale of 
operations, high overhead costs for factory space and utilities and relatively weak 
demand.
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The trend in manufacturing value added provides some indication of changes in 
the performance of the sector. The contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP in 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines averaged US$15.6 million between 1989 and 1993, and 
16.2 million between 1994 and 1998 (table 3). Meanwhile, the average percentage 
contribution of manufacturing to real value added decreased from 9.0 per cent between 
1989 and 1993 to 8.2 per cent between 1994 and 1998. The poor performance of the 
sector is reflected in the growth in output. Real manufacturing output declined by 0.9 per 
cent during the period 1990-1993 and by 0.4 per cent between 1994 to 1998. Trade 
diversion and the migration of companies to Mexico due to lower labour costs and 
proximity to the United States, led to contractions in output in Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines. Some domestic producers, accustomed to sheltered markets, were incapable 
of facing foreign competition with the lowering of the Common External Tariff (CET) 
and increased openness of the economy. This resulted in business failures that have 
adversely affected value added.
MVA per capita in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines increased from $105 in 1980 
to $147 in 1997, compared with a decline from $694 to $641 in Latin America and an 
increase from $161 to $290 in developing countries as a group. Real average annual 
growth in per capita MVA, however, fell from 5.0 per cent between 1970 and 1980 to 1.0 
per cent between 1990 and 1997. This was accounted for in part by some firms going out 
of business because of their inability to face import competition and the migration of 
other firms to cheaper labour destinations, such as Mexico.
IIIc.1 Productivity in Saint Vincent and the G renadines
As in Dominica and Guyana, the majority of manufacturers visited at plant 
sites in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines regarded low productivity as a major constraint 
to competitive operations. Labour productivity is adversely affected by low skills level 
of the workforce and inadequate training and extension systems. Capital productivity is 
also low because of the crude technology and inefficient plant and equipment used. Plant 
layout, organization and management of the work-flow and inventory compound the 
productivity problem.
IIIc.2. Real Effective Exchange Rate developments for Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
As seen in graph 2 below, the REER for Saint Vincent and Grenadines 
depreciated from the middle of the 1980s until around 1992. Thereafter it appreciated, 
except between 1993 and 1995, when it depreciated somewhat. This pattern suggests 
some broad improvement in price competitiveness from the latter half of the 1980s to the 
early 1990s and deteriorating relative price-cost conditions, compared with trading 
partners during the latter part of the1990s. Since Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and 
other Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) countries maintain a fixed 
exchange rate of EC$2.70 to the United States dollar, its REER reflected relative
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movements in the United States dollar compared with other currencies, and its inflation 
rate compared with its trading partners.
G raph 2
G raph of the Real Effective Exchange Rates 
of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines -1998
REER of ST VIN & GRENS 1985-1998
—
St. Vincent & Gre
Years
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)
IIId . T rinidad and Tobago
Trinidad and Tobago has the most advanced manufacturing sector in CARICOM, 
as measured by the closeness of the sector to international best practice. Manufacturing 
activities are divided into two fairly distinct segments. There is the heavy capital 
intensive manufacturing segment clustered around oil and natural gas refining and the 
non-oil lighter manufacturing activities. Typical of oil-based manufacturing world-wide, 
this part of the manufacturing sector in Trinidad and Tobago has been oriented to the 
export market from the outset. Meanwhile, non-oil manufacturing evolved from the 
import substitution model of industrialization under sheltered tariff, quotas and other 
forms of protection. With structural reforms and trade liberalization, however, this 
subsector has become much more attuned to export promotion. Oil-based manufacturing 
consists of a range of activities, including petrochemicals (ethylene, propylene, and 
epoxy resins), inorganic chemicals, plastics and pharmaceuticals. Other manufacturing 
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Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 115.4 85.0 3.2 2.9 0.3 -6.1
Mining and quarrying<1> 716.7 476.7 19.8 16.4 -10.2 -1.7
Manufacturing 361.1 374.2 10.1 12.9 -4.2 4.8
Electricity, gas and water 49.8 44.9 1.4 1.5 -3.2 3.8
Construction<2> 310.6 306.8 8.6 10.5 -5.9 8.1
Wholesale and retail trade 452 392.7 12.5 13.5 -8.8 3.6
Transport and communication<3> 379.4 334.9 10.5 11.5 -6.1 4.9
Finance<4> 343.4 285.5 9.6 9.8 -3.2 0.3
Hotels, Guest Houses & Restaurants 5.4 39.8 0.2 1.4 19.2
Community, personal and social services 806.5 217.5 21.6 7.5 -18.6 0.6
General government 602.6 418.3 16.7 14.4 -6.8 -1.8
LESS: Imputed Bank Services 89.8 71.1 2.5 2.4 -9.5 7.0
TOTAL Gross Domestic Product 3606.4 2905.2 100.0 100.0 -6.3 1.8
Source: ECLAC, based on national data
Some of the major areas of activity in the non-oil based sector are food, beverages 
and tobacco processing, furniture manufacturing and small-scale assembly of various 
items. The food and beverage subsector along with chemicals and downstream activities 
and metals are the most dynamic segments of manufacturing. Activities in the food and 
beverage subsector entail production of flour, animal feed, cereals, oils and fats, rum and 
beer and fruit processing. Production of sawn timber, plywood and household furniture 
is carried out by a number of small producers and the main State-owned enterprise, 
Trinidad and Tobago Forest Product Co. Ltd. (TANTEAK). TANTEAK, however, has 
accumulated losses over time due to technical, financial and managerial problems.
Table 4 above indicates that the value of real output in the manufacturing sector in 
Trinidad and Tobago averaged US$361.1 million for the period 1989 to 1993 and 
increased to US$374.2 million between 1994 to 1998. The average percentage 
contribution of the manufacturing sector to real output stood at 10.1 per cent between 
1989 and 1993, but rose to 12.9 per cent between 1994 and 1998. Meanwhile, 
manufacturing value added contracted by 4.2 per cent from 1990 to 1993. However, real 
output recovered to grow by 4.8 per cent between 1994 and 1998. Per capita MVA10 
declined from $450 in 1980 to $403 in 1997. This was similar to the decline from $694 
to $641 for Latin America, but was unfavourable relative to the increase from $161 to 
290 for developing countries as a group. Manufacturing output in the latter part of the
10 See UNIDO op. cit. p.g.12
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1990s seems to have benefited from faster growth in productivity, strengthened business 
investment and the streamlining and restructuring of systems of production.
IIId.1 Productivity in Trinidad and Tobago
Labour productivity in Trinidad and Tobago’s manufacturing sector, as 
measured by value added per employee grew by 27.51 per cent between 1985 and 1995, 
from $16,111 to $20,543. This resulted in an annual average productivity growth of 2.5 
per cent, which is probably one of the higher rates in CARICOM. The market oriented 
reform of the late 1980s, the modernization of plant through new investment and the 
policies to improve the skills of the labour force have contributed to increased 
productivity in the Trinidad and Tobago manufacturing sector.
IIId.2 Real Effective Exchange Rate Developments for Trinidad and Tobago
The REER of Trinidad and Tobago trended downwards for the most part 
since 1985 (see Graph 3 below). From a high of 164.8 in 1985, the REER depreciated to 
87.74 in 1998, suggesting steadily improving price competitiveness of the country’s 
exports. Improved price competitiveness was influenced largely by the devaluation of the 
1980s and 1990s that made Trinidad and Tobago’s exports relatively cheaper. Further, 
price competition was reinforced by improved quality competitiveness that resulted from 
structural reforms in the manufacturing industry, leading to improved productive 
efficiency, strengthened management and the use of more up to date technology. Trade 
liberalization and the disciplining impact of foreign competition also resulted in the 
closure of unprofitable and marginal producers and forced those that remained to adopt 
the measures that were required to compete.
G raph 3 
G raph of the Real Effective Exchange Rates 
of Trinidad and Tobago1985-1998
REERs of TRINIDAD& TOBAGO 1985-1998
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Years
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)
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IV. FACTORS AFFECTING TH E COM PETITIVENESS 
OF CARIBBEAN MANUFACTURERS
IVa. Efficiency in factor m arkets and competitiveness of CARICOM
m anufacturing
In assessing the competitiveness of regional manufacturers, efficiency and 
productivity is relevant not only for product markets, but also for factor markets. Factor 
market efficiency speaks of the extent to which the markets for factors, especially labour 
and capital, are transparent, free of structural rigidities and reward participants according 
to their productivity.
Labour market flexibility is vital to the allocation of labour to areas and activities 
where it is demanded. In the countries studied and the region, as a whole, turgid, 
inflexible labour markets, however, hinder the movement of labour to productive 
activities where it is demanded. In many cases, the lack of freedom of movement of 
labour between industries is a reflection of a shortage of needed skills. In Dominica, 
Guyana and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, for example, manufacturers noted that 
although a large pool of labour could be found for low level, repetitive tasks, there was a 
severe shortage of highly skilled technicians and managers. This skills mismatch has 
been an important constraint to the ability of manufacturers to undertake timely 
improvements to their production and management machinery. Moreover, it is a 
reflection of the dualistic structure of the regional labour market and the impact of the 
brain drain on the availability of skilled labour.
With respect to the price of labour, the wage formation process in the region is 
largely determined by forces other than the market. Therefore, it is not uncommon to 
find market situations where wage rates are either higher or lower than the productivity of 
workers. Imperfect labour markets provide room for the capture of rents by workers or 
employers. Furthermore, regional trade unions often demand wage increases that seek to 
maintain the purchasing power of workers, but which may not be based on labour 
productivity. Such wage increases that over-shoot growth in labour productivity tend to 
undermine competitiveness. Competitiveness is particularly affected in industries, such 
as textiles and electronic parts assembly, where comparative advantage is based on cheap 
abundant labour. Moreover, given the limited room for the use of monetary policy in 
countries such as the OECS, containment of factor costs and fiscal restraint are 
particularly important in fostering competitive industries. Unsustainable growth in 
labour and other input costs undermine industrial competitiveness and the capacity of 
manufacturers to generate future productive employment.
IVb. Industrial policies and the competitiveness of CARICOM  m anufacturers
As suggested earlier, Caribbean manufacturing was developed based on an 
industrial policy strategy that was largely protectionist. High levels of effective 
protection resulted from high tariffs, quota restrictions and a wide range of incentives and
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subsidies, including tax holidays, accelerated depreciation allowances and duty free 
imports of raw materials and capital goods.
It is widely accepted that the most appropriate industrial measures are those which 
are price based (such as tariffs), uniform and applied horizontally or evenly across 
sectors. This was hardly what occurred in the case of Caribbean manufacturing. The 
drive to replace imports with domestic production resulted in a severe anti-export bias, 
and an over-reliance on a small domestic and regional market for manufactured goods. 
For Barbados, for instance, Whitehall11 found that nominal and effective rates of 
protection increased between 1960 and 1980.
In the Caribbean, the infant industry argument that justified the provision of 
incentives to facilitate manufacturing activities was either taken too far or taken out of 
context. The logic of the argument that infant industries would grow up to compete 
based on merit did not materialize in most countries. The import substitution, 
protectionist strategy stifled competition, promoted declining manufacturing activities 
notably in electronics and textiles, and acted as a disincentive to exports. In addition, the 
strategy of ‘picking winners’ or targeting prospective growth industries led to the 
promotion of some activities in which most of the countries might never be able to 
compete. A notable example of this was the automobile industry in Trinidad and Tobago 
and refrigerators and household appliances in Guyana and other countries.
IVc. Industrial investment and competitiveness of regional m anufacturers
Investment in manufacturing plant and equipment and training of workers is an 
important factor underpinning competitiveness. The investment process, though, is not a 
straightforward one. Generally, expectation of future long run profit is an important 
consideration in the decision to invest. In real life, investors are not as rational as theory 
makes them out to be due to information shortage. However, even crudely, the present 
value of the future expected profits from the investment must equal or exceed the costs of 
the investment (in terms of interest rate, use of retained earnings and so on).
Unstable demand for their products and weak profit expectations and difficulties 
in accessing finance have led to low levels of new manufacturing investment in the 
Caribbean. In addition, inadequate and poor quality new investments result in poor 
competitive performance that adversely affects profitability and the ability to invest in the 
future. Many plant managers in the countries of focus noted a strong positive 
relationship between sales, especially export proceeds, and their ability to undertake new 
investment. Exports are particularly important, since they earn the foreign exchange 
required to purchase imported plant and machinery. Indications are that the majority of 
manufacturers in the region have failed to retool and restructure their operations 
sufficiently to meet the competitive challenge.
See Whitehall, P., (1984) “Protection in the Manufacturing Sector of Barbados”, Central Bank of 
Barbados, Quarterly Economic review, Vol. 11 No.2, pp. 9-27.
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Foreign direct investment has been attracted to the sector under joint ventures, 
subcontracting and other arrangements. However, a number of factors have retarded the 
competitiveness of these branch plants. Important among these is a competitive strategy 
that is based on cheap labour and incentives rather than on quality and innovation. Also 
the footloose nature of these foreign enterprises limits the transfer of skills and 
techniques. In a study of innovation Agamus,12 a German consulting Group, found that 
companies that manufacture other enterprises’ products under licence tend to be poor 
innovators. This has been the case with the arrangements under which Caribbean 
manufacturers have produced.
In countries such as Guyana, Jamaica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines the 
high cost of finance in terms of interest rates, cash-based collateral requirements and 
closing fees have impeded new plant investment. Low investment in new plant and 
machinery has been aggravated by the problem of poor maintenance of established 
plants. In the Caribbean, as in many other less developed regions, the effective useful life 
of infrastructure and capital (plant, machinery and equipment) is adversely affected by 
poor maintenance. In many instances, these factors of production are used for extended 
periods with little or no servicing, repairs and upgrading. This severely limits the 
productive life of these assets. Therefore, in many situations, completely new capital has 
to be bought or installed over fairly short time periods just to continue the production 
process. This leads to high fixed costs and with relatively low levels of output results in 
high average production costs. In some countries, notably Guyana and Jamaica adverse 
macroeconomic policies and the foreign exchange constraint severely limited the ability 
of manufacturers to carry out plant maintenance during the last two decades.
IVd. The im pact of competition policies on m anufacturing competitiveness
Polices that promote market competition based on prices and discourage 
monopoly and other anti-competitive practices are crucial in the development of 
competitive manufacturing enterprises in the Caribbean. Lipsey and Chrystal13 state that 
competition could be promoted by influencing either market structure or the behaviour of 
individual firms. Where possible, though, these policies should aim to impact on the 
broad market structure, rather than the individual firm. This provides the basis for widely 
applicable benchmarks, rather than policies selected on a case-by-case basis. Except for 
Jamaica, Caribbean countries do not have competition policies. However, like other 
countries, competition in the manufacturing sector is influenced by the level of 
concentration of the firms in the sector and the degree of contestability in the market. 
Here contestability means that sunk costs of entry or exit are low enough to allow new 
firms to limit the ability of incumbent firms to make above normal profits. Competition, 
therefore, has a disciplining effect on incumbent producers.
12 See Financial Times, Monday, 19 July 1999.
13 See Lipsey, R. G., and Chrystal, K. A., (1995) “ An Introduction to Positive Economics", Oxford
University Press.
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The extent to which the Caribbean manufacturing industry is contestable is related 
to two other issues. These are the extent to which new entrants serve to discipline 
established ones and whether internal X-inefficiencies in the firm are eliminated as a 
result of competition. Today, as in the past, Caribbean manufacturers still seek protection 
from competition. Many manufacturers and agro-processors still view competition as a 
threat to their market share and survival. Therefore, the virtuous effects of learning from 
competitors and responding by differentiating their products have not been fully utilized 
by Caribbean manufacturers. Many manufacturers with a fairly sheltered domestic 
market and niches overseas fail to invest needed capital on modern technology, research 
and development and innovation. Internal inefficiencies in these firms remain high as 
output is not maximized from resource input. Undoubtedly, such firms are unlikely to 
sustain market share in outdated protected markets. Forstner and Ballance14, in cross 
country regression analysis, found that levels of industrial concentration tend to be higher 
in the developing country group than the Developed Market Economies group. This, 
they explained, may be due to differences in market size and economies of scale, acting 
as a greater entry barrier in developing countries.
Caribbean industrial structure suggests that levels of industrial concentration are 
significant. The largest firms tend to hold significant market share because of their 
entrenched positions. Also, established market outlets and arrangements and access to 
credit based on reputation provide an advantage for existing firms. In many cases, 
government industrial incentive policies favour large firms because of the presumption 
that they are more likely to penetrate foreign markets and have greater ability to create 
employment.
IVe. M arketing strategies and arrangem ents and the competitiveness of 
CARICOM  m anufacturers
Marketing, being a more recent area of specialization, has not benefited to the 
same degree from learning by doing as industrial production. However, it is indisputable 
that Caribbean manufacturers cannot compete on the local market or attain growth in 
exports without quality marketing systems. The marketing arrangements for Caribbean 
manufactures evolved out of those that existed for agricultural products. The market for 
sugar and bananas, for instance, was largely a ready-made preferential market. These 
two exports had established marketing channels with brokers and market makers.
Caribbean manufacturers have not been as fortunate as the exporters of these 
agricultural products. In the first place, manufacturers have not benefited to the same 
extent from such a wide-ranging preferential trading regime. Secondly, as fairly new 
comers to the international market for manufactures, they needed to actively promote the 
credentials of their products. This has not been easy for most manufacturers, especially 
small-scale producers, with limited finance and marketing expertise.
14 See Forstner, H and Balance, R., (1990) “Competing in a Global Economy", UNIDO.
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Strategic, scientific market intelligence that is vital to the competitiveness of 
Caribbean manufacturing exports is sadly lacking. Further, the market intelligence 
exercise that should precede the production of a manufactured good is either not done at 
all or undertaken after production. Hence, there is little or no demand analysis to assess 
consumers’ preferences for the product. Majaro15, for instance, holds the view that 
investment within the firm should include the full cost of pre-launch marketing, market 
research, promotion, sampling and physical distribution. However, the inattention of 
regional manufacturers’ to these areas has affected them negatively.
Studies have shown that the efficiency and timing of delivery to the market 
impact significantly on the export success of firms. Many smaller exporters of 
manufactured products face a serious delivery and distribution constraint. Even where 
the product is capable of making a profitable market entry, weak delivery channels 
prevent this possible outcome. Most Caribbean manufacturers can be considered as small 
to medium-size firms by international standards. As such, their limited capital base 
precludes them from having company-based delivery and distribution systems.
Moreover, the use of foreign distribution channels puts regional firms at a 
disadvantage, compared with foreign multinational corporations. Large multinational 
corporations (MNCs) have their own well-established channels of distribution. They can, 
therefore, harness economies of scale and scope from a combined internal marketing 
channel within the corporation. Being seasoned exporters, MNCs accrue significant 
learning from experience and well connected delivery outlets. Where Caribbean 
manufacturers undertake joint marketing with MNCs, they need to ensure that the 
arrangements can cater to their needs and present opportunities for learning.
In many cases regional producers utilize only one or two channels of 
communication. For the most part, regional manufacturers have not made good use of 
surveys, sales promotions, publicity campaigns, direct marketing, network marketing and 
personal selling and other marketing techniques.
Further, high advertising costs and limited expertise adversely impacted on 
manufacturers’ export promotion capacity. Some of the larger manufacturers have 
undertaken overseas advertising campaigns. Especially where niche agro-industrial goods 
are concerned, there is need for targeted advertising. With respect to their objectives, it is 
fair to say that much of the advertising undertaken by Caribbean manufacturers is without 
any clear focus. Generally, manufacturers are aware of the need to advertise the 
products, but seem unaware of the potential of strategic advertising.
Marketing in the manufacturing and agro-processing sectors is hampered by a 
shortage of finance, skilled personnel and institutional support systems. In countries 
where export credit is available, for instance, much of the funds is used for the 
purchasing of raw materials and intermediate goods and little is allocated to marketing. 
This results from too much emphasis on production. Further, many manufacturers do not
15 See Majaro, S., "The Essence of Marketing", Prentice Hall International Ltd, 1993.
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borrow enough funds to cover the marketing function of their operations. In fact, it is 
still viewed by many as a ‘soft ‘ function. In addition, for the most part marketing 
institutions are lacking or inadequate.
IVf. Environm ental standards and m anufacturing competitiveness
The comparative advantage of a country, especially during the early stages of 
development, is usually based on its abundant resource or factor endowment. This 
provides an important role for the rate and manner in which factors are used up or 
depleted. The old school of thought viewed the environment as an unlimited basket of 
resources which firms could exploit at will. In recent times, however, the rapid rate of 
resource depletion, species extinction and the adverse effects on man have led to calls for 
environmental regulations and preservation.
The new school of thought regards the global environment as the so-called ‘global 
commons’. Consequently, these thinkers argue that humanity at large has a stake in 
environmental preservation everywhere. Further, some developed countries have been 
trying to get the WTO to include environment provisions in its general trade rules. This, 
no doubt, would allow these countries to impose tariffs, countervailing duties or other 
trade restrictions on commodities from countries that do not meet their environmental 
standards. The motive for such measures is often protectionist and they should not be 
included in WTO regulations.
Environmental considerations are closely linked to the evolution of production 
and trade in the Caribbean. Comparative and competitive advantage in the region has 
been based strongly on natural resource endowment. This has been the case from sugar to 
tourism. This underscores the need for appropriate environmental considerations in 
production and marketing of products. Two examples are instructive here. First, had the 
Windward Island banana industry marketed the fruit as a ‘green’, fairly organically 
grown, sweet and environmentally friendly fruit, it could have obtained better returns in 
the EU market. Second, the furniture-making and fisheries industries in Guyana need to 
adopt environmentally sustainable production practices in terms of the exploitation of the 
raw materials and market their products as such.
It is suspected that a number of regional manufacturers would put up resistance to 
meeting established environmental standards. They would contend that the costs of 
achieving these standards are added overheads for them. But as long as these standards 
are not onerous and take into consideration the level of development of the countries, 
they normally contribute to the success of the firms.
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IVg. The im pact of macroeconomic fundam entals on m anufacturing
competitiveness
Although competitiveness is largely determined by factor productivity and the 
ability to offer lower prices and higher quality products, the macroeconomic environment 
is also an important influence on the ability of firms to compete. Macroeconomic 
fundamentals are a package of policies which, from theory and practical evidence, are 
proven to promote economic growth and development. Economic fundamentals in the 
context of a study of competitiveness in the Caribbean include: an open, liberalized 
trading environment, stable and competitive exchange rates, positive real interest rates 
which promote savings and productive investment. Also, inflation rates should be low 
and predictable, budget deficits and debt should be contained and the financial system 
must be sound and imbued with high levels of competition.
In the 1980s and 1990s, CARICOM countries undertook structural adjustment 
and reforms to make their economic environments more open and competitive. This 
reflected the change in focus from import substitution to export promotion. Adjustments 
and reforms undertaken included trade and foreign exchange liberalization, the 
dismantling of quotas, and the implementation of a harmonized lower tariff - under the 
Common External Tariff (CET). Lower CET rates should benefit regional manufacturers 
by reducing the price of imported raw materials, plant and other factor inputs. Further, in 
some countries, notably Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana, many State 
monopolies that have burdened government finances for a long time have been 
privatized. Privatization is sometimes viewed as a one-time capitalization of the net 
future stream of income from these enterprises. However, in many cases, the choice was 
between allowing these enterprises to continue making losses or making them profitable. 
Vital to the success of the privatization effort is the investment of part of the proceeds in 
infrastructure and training facilities to help export manufacturing enterprises. Moreover, 
where privatization leads to lower costs of utility inputs (electricity, telecommunications 
transport, etc.), it could facilitate manufacturing competitiveness.
Sound monetary policy favourably influences the cost and availability of credit. 
This leads to competitive interest rates and the deepening of capital markets. 
Manufacturers and agro-processors in Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and 
Guyana note that access to reasonably priced finance is a major constraint on production. 
Tight monetary policy in Jamaica in recent times, however, has basically crippled 
manufacturing production. A weighted average loan interest rate of 33 per cent and an 
interest rate spread of over 17 per cent in Jamaica in 1998 has made a number of agro­
processing and manufacturing activities unprofitable.
Sound exchange rate policy is crucial to strengthening manufacturing export 
competitiveness. Unstable and overvalued exchange rates retard the competitiveness of a 
country’s exports. Overvalued exchange rates, in particular, artificially inflate the price 
of exports and deflate the price of competing imports, resulting in reduced demand for 
price elastic exports and increased demand for imports. An overvalued exchange rate is a 
tax on exports and a subsidy for imports. Therefore, to help exporters provide 
competitively priced manufactures, policy makers must ensure a realistic exchange rate.
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This is particularly important for the region since most of its manufactures are weakly 
differentiated, making price competitiveness more important. In Guyana and Jamaica 
fluctuating and overvalued exchange rates in the 1980s and 1990s have adversely 
affected manufacturing exports. Meanwhile, Trinidad and Tobago’s competitive 
devaluation in the latter part of the 1980s, wage and public expenditure restraint all 
helped to improve the export performance of the non-oil manufacturing sector.
The type of exchange rate regime is also crucial. Evidence shows that fixed 
exchange rates tend to promote price stability. This is as a result of the discipline imposed 
on policy makers who desire to avoid the inflationary costs of a fluctuating rate. Also, 
confidence in the domestic currency is strengthened, thereby reducing the likelihood of it 
being undermined. Some countries, such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, have 
adopted adjustable exchange rates. Their aim is to provide room for exchange rate 
realignment when domestic price/costs and external conditions change. However, this 
peg system only works well when supported by credible and responsible monetary and 
fiscal policies and non-political intervention for maintaining the peg.
Fully flexible exchange rates tend be associated with higher productivity and 
economic growth. Productivity gains stem from improved efficiency, because flexible 
rates allow suitable adjustments in prices and real wages in response to economic or 
policy shocks.
In general, the evidence on the exchange rate suggests that flexible rates may be 
more conducive to promoting competitiveness. However, in small countries such as the 
OECS States, the fixed pegged rate have imbued the macroeconomy with stability and 
confidence, encouraged investment and kept inflation in check. Given the harsh 
experience of Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago with flexible exchange rates, 
countries with fixed rates may be reluctant to change. In fact, it might be more 
appropriate to maintain fixed exchange rates. What this means, however, is that these 
countries will have to make other macroeconomic tools work harder to promote industrial 
competitiveness. Policy tools could include the strengthening of fiscal savings for 
facilitating capital projects, strengthening capital markets and financial intermediation. 
Meanwhile, countries with flexible rates could use competitive devaluation to boost 
export growth, where necessary.
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V. INDICATORS OF TH E COM PETITIVENESS 
OF CARIBBEAN MANUFACTURERS
In addition to the indicators of competitiveness provided by the examination of 
productivity and real effective exchange rates in the countries of focus, this section looks 
at other, more general indicators of competitiveness in the Caribbean.
Va. T rade perform ance
Czinkota and Wongtada (1997)16 have provided a basic ex-post or realized 
measure of competitiveness that shows how the industries of a country perform in trade. 
The long-term changes in these indices provide some indication, however crude, of the 
ability of a country’s industries to gain market share. They offer the following definition: 
Competitiveness = Export volume - Import volume 
Export volume + Import volume
The above indicator measures competitiveness as the sector’s trade balance as a 
proportion of total trade volume (exports + imports). The values of this competitiveness 
measure range from +1 to -1 , which are extremes and are highly unlikely. A 
competitiveness measure of +1 indicates that the industry only exports and has no 
imports, while a measure of -1 means that the industry only imports, but does not export.
Highly competitive industries would tend to have competitiveness figures that are 
relatively close to +1. Although values may be distorted by inflation, they provide for 
improved standardization. They are, therefore, used in an adapted version of the above 
measure to evaluate the trade competitiveness of the manufacturing sector of selected 
countries. In this measure -
Competitiveness = Export Value - Import Value 
Export Value + Import Value
The values of this measure range from 1 to -1 like the volume measure.
See Czinkota, M. R., and Wongtada N., (1997). “The Effect of Export Promotion on U.S. Trade 
Performance: An Analysis of Industry Internationalization", The International Trade Journal, Vol. XI, 
No.1, Spring, pp. 5-37.
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Table 7
Indices of competitiveness (m easured as Exports value - Im ports value/ Exports value + Im ports value)
for selected countries for the period 1986-1996
Country 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average
Indices
Barbados -0.378 -0.618 -0.550 -0.619 -0.653 -0.656 -0.598 -0.598 -0.614 -0.777 -0.832 -0.551
Belize -0.475 -0.686 -0.586 -0.672 -0.682 -0.792 -0.718 -0.740 -0.680 -0.763 -0.618
Guyana -0.875 -0.878 -0.883 -0.871 -0.814 -0.904 -0.891 -0.847 -0.772 -0.813 -0.703
Jamaica -0.653 -0.628 -0.667 -0.704 -0.744 -0.730 -0.662 -0.629 -0.621 -0.650 -0.757 -0.608
Trinidad and 
Tobago
-0.507 -0.421 -0.220 -0.247 -0.177 -0.310 -0.285 -0.257 0.214 -0.435 -0.997 -0.240
Antigua and 
Barbuda
-0.713 -0.850 -0.843 -0.836 -0.727 -0.361
Dominica -0.432 -0.524 -0.606 -0.642 -0.647 -0.600 -0.624 -0.596 -0.550 -0.950 -0.953 -0.561
Grenada -0.903 -0.957 -0.795 -0.819 -0.768 -0.528 0.524 -0.901 -0.899 -0.906 -0.632
Montserrat -0.760 -0.684 -0.823 -0.958 -0.990 -0.977 -0.973 -0.977 -0.649
St. Kitts and 
Nevis
-0.558 -0.559 -0.624 -0.655 -0.630 -0.684 -0.337
St. Lucia -0.677 -0.630 -0.668 -0.728 -0.686 -0.737 -0.613 -0.661 -0.754 -0.732 -0.816 -0.626
St. Vincent -0.730 -0.702 -0.600 -0.672 -0.642 -0.783 -0.762 -0.815 -0.828 -0.594
United
States
-0.309 -0.284 -0.232 0.819 0.221 -0.088 0.258 -0.136 -0.154 -0.119 -0.859 -0.002
United
kingdom
-0.063 -0.075 -0.115 -0.110 -0.074 -0.034 -0.055 -0.089 0.007 0.078 0.003 -0.048
Japan 0.650 0.691 0.506 0.460 0.432 0.459 0.498 0.493 0.605 0.485 0.459 0.480
Mexico -0.303 0.039 -0.158 -0.170 -0.297 -0.365 -0.074 -0.174 -0.119 0.032 -0.144
Venezuela -0.711 -0.713 -0.982 -0.395 -0.304 -0.591 -0.654 -0.761 -0.368 -0.412 -0.536
Hong Kong 0.053 0.043 0.027 0.041 0.847 0.122 0.008 0.008 -0.112 -0.032 0.026 0.091
Singapore -0.108 -0.081 -0.069 -0.066 -0.088 -0.078 -0.067 -0.078 -0.022 -0.024 -0.021 -0.062
Republic of 
Korea
0.219 0.235 0.233 0.169 0.140 0.101 0.114 0.029 -0.008 0.100 0.070 0.121
Source: ECLAC based on Official figures and the International Trade Statistics Yearbook, various issues
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Table 7 above shows ex-post indices of competitiveness based on the indicator 
provided. The table reveals that on average the manufacturing industry in Caribbean 
countries tends to have high negative values. This suggests that average trade 
competitiveness is weak, as is reflected in the large manufacturing trade deficits relative 
to total trade.
There are some variations at the country level, but the pattern of weak 
competitiveness generally holds. For Guyana, export competitiveness is rather weak with 
the index ranging from -0.772 in 1995 to -0.904 in 1992, while the average for 1987 to 
1996 was -0.855. This average figure indicates that the trade deficit was a full 85 per 
cent of total trade. The high negative average clearly reveals the weak quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of Guyana’s manufacturing trade performance. From a quantitative 
viewpoint, the absolute volume of Guyana’s exports has been small over the period. 
Meanwhile, from a qualitative standpoint, exports have consisted primarily of low value 
(near commodity) manufactured goods with low income and price elasticities of demand 
in foreign markets. These include garments, textiles, processed food and beverages and 
pharmaceutical products.
The average value of the competitiveness measure for Dominica is -0.648, which 
clearly reflects the weak trade performance. This performance, however, was generally 
stronger than that of Guyana and probably reflects the success of a few Dominican 
industries such as the soap and detergents manufacturers that have gained some success 
on the regional and international markets.
The manufacturing sector in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had an average 
value of the competitiveness measure of -0.726 for the period 1986 to 1994. The values 
ranged from -0.600 in 1988 to -0.83 in 1994. Further, since 1988, the indices have 
tended to become larger negative numbers, suggesting worsening trade competitiveness 
over time. The weak trade performance over time seems to be linked to the inability of 
the major sectors to compete. These sectors include the food, beverages and tobacco, 
textiles, clothing and footwear and miscellaneous manufacturing. Declining export 
performance was also linked to the closure of a number of textile factories.
As expected, Trinidad and Tobago was the only exception to the pattern of 
extremely weak competitiveness in CARICOM. The average value of the 
competitiveness indicator for Trinidad and Tobago was -0.331. Therefore, although the 
manufacturing trade of Trinidad and Tobago was in deficit for the whole period, except 
1994, the deficit was only 33 per cent of total trade. The indicator for Trinidad and 
Tobago is influenced by the classification of manufacturing as SITC 5 to 8, which 
includes SITC 5 (chemicals), SITC 6 (basic manufactures), SITC 7 (machines, transport 
equipment) and SITC 8 (miscellaneous manufactured goods). The petrochemical 
subsector remains the dominant contributor to manufacturing exports, but it has been 
increasingly supported by non-petrochemical based manufacturing in recent years. The 
more important petrochemical contributors to exports are inorganic chemical, elements 
and oxides, ammonia and anhydrous products and fertilizers. These are supported by 
downstream activities, including iron and steel and plastic products.
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In fact this diversification into higher value added downstream activities is crucial 
to improving the competitiveness of the sector in Trinidad and Tobago.
The indicators for Hong Kong (0.094) and the Republic of Korea (0.127) reflected 
trade surpluses relative to total trade. Meanwhile Mexico (-0.144) and Singapore (-0.062) 
both had average trade deficits to total trade over the period, indicating comparatively 
weaker competitive positions.
Vb. C aribbean participation in international trade 
Table 8 
The share of different countries and regions in world trade share of world trade 
1960-1994 (percentages in curren t dollars)
Exports Imports
1960 1970 1980 1990 1994 1960 1970 1980 1990 1994
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Developed Countries 65.9 70.9 62.6 71.7 69.4 64.9 71.6 68.3 72.4 67.9
Group of Seven 48.9 52.7 46.3 52.1 51.3 41.9 44.8 43.1 52.3 50.2
United States 15.8 13.7 11 11.5 12.3 11.1 12.2 12.5 14.5 16.3
Japan 3.1 6.1 6.5 8.4 9.5 3.3 5.8 6.8 6.6 6.5
European Union 32.2 35.5 32.5 39.5 36.5 32.7 35.3 34.6 39.6 34.6
Economies in 
Transition
10.1 9.8 7.7 5 3.5 10.2 9.7 7.7 5.5 3.1
Developing Countries 21.9 18.4 28.7 23.3 26.7 22.6 17.9 22.9 22.1 28.9
L.A. & Caribbean 7.7 5.5 5.5 3.9 3.8 7.3 5.5 5.9 3.3 4.8
LAIA 5.6 4 4 3.3 3.4 5 3.5 4.1 2.4 4
CACM 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2
CARICOM 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.2
Asia 9.5 8.1 8.2 16.7 21.4 9.7 7.8 12.3 15.9 22
Newly Industrializing 
Economies (NIEs) 3.4 3 6 10.3 14.3 3.6 3.8 5.8 10.3 14.6
China 2 0.7 0.9 1.8 2.9 1.9 0.7 0.9 1.5 2.7
India 1 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6
Africa 4.2 4.1 4.7 2.3 1.7 4.9 3.4 3.6 2.2 1.8
Oil-exporting
Countries 6.8 6.3 16.4 5.9 5.2 4.8 3.5 7 3.9 5.1
Non-oil-exporting
Countries 15.1 12.1 12.3 17.4 21.5 17.9 14.4 15.9 18.2 23.8
Source: ECLAC, from UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1991, New York. 
1992, Sales No. E/F.92.II.D.6; United Nations, World Economic Survey, 1993, New York. United Nations publication, 
Sales No. E.93.II.C.1; and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, Washington, 
D.C., 1993.
Table 8 above, shows that between 1960 and 1990, CARICOM provided 0.5 per 
cent of world exports in 1960, and 0.4 per cent and 0.2 per cent in 1970 and 1990,
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respectively. However, by 1994 the figure declined to 0.1 per cent maintaining a 
declining trend. In contrast, developed countries' share of world exports increased from 
65.9 per cent in 1960 to 69.4 per cent in 1994. Within this group, exports of the Group of 
7 rose from 48.9 per cent of the total in 1960 to 51.3 per cent in 1994. For Latin America 
and the Caribbean as a group, the share of world exports slipped from 7.7 per cent in 
1960 to 3.8 per cent in 1994. Actually, for the region, this decline reflected a persistent 
contraction over the period, which could be explained by a number of factors including 
weak competitiveness. In the Newly Industrializing Economies of Asia (NIEs), however, 
world export market share expanded from 3.4 per cent to 14.3 per cent, the fastest rate of 
growth for any region.
CARICOM's share of imports slipped from 0.6 per cent of the world total in 1960 
to 0.2 per cent in 1994. This suggests that contracting export proceeds might have 
adversely affected the capacity of the countries to import. This underscores the 
importance of foreign exchange availability in the import function of Caribbean 
economies. For Latin America and the Caribbean, as a group, the share of world imports 
declined from 7.3 per cent in 1960 to 4.8 per cent in 1994.
World share of imports of developed countries increased from 64.9 per cent in 
1960 to 67.9 per cent in 1994. Of this total, imports of the seven Industrialized 
Economies grew from 41.9 per cent in 1960 to 50.2 per cent in 1994. Meanwhile, the 
NIEs' share of world imports grew from 3.6 per cent in 1960 to 14.6 per cent in 1994.
Competitiveness: A note on the experience of the Asian Tigers
The Asian tigers’ experience has been showcased as a model for developing countries. 
What is hardly ever said, is that the Asian model is a classical case of Sir Arthur Lewis’ model of 
export-led industrialization. The Asian NICs emphasized export growth, whereas Caribbean 
manufacturers focused on import substitution.
The emphasis on export growth in Asia provided the benefits of competition, foreign 
direct investment and adaptation of technology and learning by doing. These factors, combined 
with sound macroeconomic fundamentals, provided the catalyst for competitive strength abroad. 
In the case of Singapore, Soon and Stoever note that the economy was transformed from an 
uncompetitive import substitution base in the early 1960s to a vibrant, diversified, competitive 
export-led base by the mid 1980s.17 In Singapore, like the other tigers, there was also a 
movement away from economic controls and State planning to market price signals and 
competition forces. Therefore, Singapore is now viewed as a stable economy with sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals built on market forces. This led the Business Environment and 
Risk Information (BERI) to rank Singapore as one of the safest foreign investment havens in the 
world in 1984 and 1985.
See Soon, T. and W. A, Stoever, “Foreign Investment and Economic Development in Singapore: 
A Policy-Oriented Approach”, The Journal of Developing Areas 30(3):317-340 April 1996.
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Manufacturing competitiveness seems to be related to the degree of industrial 
concentration. Countries whose output and exports of manufactured goods are 
concentrated in a few products tend to be less competitive than countries with more 
diversified export structures. This may partly reflect the fact that countries whose 
exports are concentrated in a few products tend to specialize based on crude resource- 
based comparative advantage in primary production or low value added manufacturing. 
Caribbean manufacturers tend to focus on the production of food and other products at 
the lower end of the value chain. Howard18 has noted that Barbados’ manufactured 
exports are highly concentrated both by commodity and market destination. This reflects 
a weakly diversified production structure, a focus on a few export products and a few 
selected markets, notably the United States and the European Union.
Table 9
Vc. Caribbean export concentration
Indices of export concentration and diversification for selected countries
1980 1994
COUNTRY Number of Concentration Number of Concentration
commodities index commodities index
exported exported
Barbados 64 0.367 56 0.234
Belize 76 0.421 14 0.43
Guyana 38 0.545 53 0.381
Jamaica 93 0.769 112 0.493
Trinidad & Tobago 119 0.636 127 0.343
Dominica 9 0.675 48 0.454
Grenada 22 0.399 26 0.316
St. Lucia 28 0.423 32 0.621
United States 236 0.064 236 0.073
United Kingdom 237 0.083 236 0.065
Japan 224 0.118 225 0.129
Hong Kong 164 0.164 177 0.153
Singapore 232 0.235 229 0.195
Republic of Korea 207 0.085 217 0.125
Source: UNCTAD, International Trade and Development Statistics
Table 9 above shows that the exports of Caribbean countries are highly 
concentrated. It is likely that the concentration indices for the manufacturing sector are 
similar to the indices for aggregate exports. Although the export concentration of most of 
the CARICOM countries listed declined between 1980 and 1994 (with the exception of 
Belize and Saint Lucia), it remained high, averaging 0.347 in 1994. For the CARICOM 
countries listed, Saint Lucia had the highest concentration index in 1994, reflecting the
See Howard, M., (1989) “Dependence and Development in Barbados 1945-1985", Carib Research 
and Publications Inc.
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importance of banana exports in total exports. Despite its relatively larger size and 
production base, Jamaica had the highest concentration ratio in 1980, and although it 
declined in 1994, it was the largest for the More Developed Countries (MDCs) of 
CARICOM. Among the Asian economies, the concentration ratios were fairly low. 
Hong Kong had indices of 0.164 and 0.153 in 1980 and 1994, respectively. Meanwhile, 
the indices for The Republic of Korea were 0.085 and 0.125 in 1980 and 1994. The low 
indices for these Asian economies reflect their success in developing competitive, 
diversified export structures, especially export manufacturing.
VI. POLICY RECOM M ENDATIONS FO R  STRENGTHENING 
THE COM PETITIVENESS OF CARICOM  MANUFACTURERS
We are now left to examine how to provide some recommendations for promoting 
the competitiveness of the regional manufacturing and agro-processing sectors. This 
requires that we consider practical and workable policies and approaches and the time 
needed to implement them. The first issue to be addressed is the microeconomic or firm 
level changes and policies which are needed to promote competitive industries. Second, 
the institutional changes necessary for policies to succeed must be examined. Finally, 
competitiveness policies must be assessed for their compatibility with regional and 
international obligations (for instance the WTO). Some of the core areas to be addressed 
are examined below.
VIa. Technology
The plant visits in the countries surveyed clearly showed a number of constraints 
that must be removed for industries to become competitive. A major constraint noted 
was the state of technology. The majority of firms admitted that their level of technology 
was much lower than what was required for them to be competitive. The solution, 
however, is not as simple as obtaining more up-to-date technology. There is a need for 
industries to adopt an integrated technology policy geared towards enhancing their 
competitiveness. This policy should address a number of key issues.
The first issue concerns the need for a technology information data bank. 
Governments in collaboration with the private sector should undertake an audit of the 
technology available on the market. This would include information on the available 
technology for different lines of manufacturing production, the costs, purchasing 
arrangements and the scope for hands-on training from the developers. To provide such 
information, there is need for a central agency to coordinate technology policy. This 
agency could be located at the Ministry of Trade or the Entrepreneurial Development 
Centre, if  there is one. Important for the firm also, is the potential cost-benefit of the 
technology to be used. This notion of value for money is crucial, since it might be 
unprofitable for firms to acquire cutting edge plant and machinery, if their scale of 
production and the size of their market do not warrant this.
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In Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica and Guyana, for instance, for 
many small manufacturers and agro-processors the most up-to-date technology may not 
be the most appropriate and cost effective. These manufacturers only need an 
improvement in their plant and equipment to produce their optimum output. For agro­
processors, these include mechanized juice extractors instead of hand-operated ones and 
uniform weights and measures calibration kits, refractometers and pH metres that could 
raise productivity and quality of output. Expensive, advanced equipment might not be 
well-suited to their operations.
A related problem has to do with the role of entrepreneurial development centres. 
In the OECS and Guyana, such centres have been conceptualized as one-stop shop focal 
points for providing a variety of services to entrepreneurs. These include quality control 
and extension, training of entrepreneurs and product development assistance. It is 
recommended that the role of these institutions be streamlined. This would permit them 
to focus on a few areas of comparative strength and to deliver them well. The areas of 
their focus could be training in product development, quality control and management 
and providing information on changes in product standards and international market 
requirements such as the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP).
Manufacturers and government-funded research and development institutes need 
to pay more attention to the adaptation technology. Teams of the most skilled workers 
should be brought together to do research and experiments to adapt and enhance standard 
technology to better serve local producers. By making technology more suited to 
indigenous needs, manufacturers can produce more differentiated and higher quality 
goods that could capture niche markets abroad.
VIb. Jo in t ventures
Caribbean manufacturers and agro-processors need to actively seek joint venture 
partners where this would be beneficial. In textiles, electronic parts and electrical goods, 
where economies of scale are important, joint venture production for export is 
particularly important. However, furniture manufacturers, fruit processors and seafood 
processing can also benefit from the finance, technology and experience of joint venture 
partners. For example, Willmore19 (1994) noted that subcontracting arrangements in 
Jamaica helped to ease the raw material and working capital constraint of local producers. 
Governments and local manufacturers should strive to ensure that joint venture 
production systems are not overly capital intensive, so that adequate employment is 
created. Also, joint ventures should be structured to facilitate the transfer of higher order 
knowledge and skills through learning by doing. Like the Asian Tiger economies, 
Caribbean joint venture partners should try to get provisions for the training of local 
skilled technicians and managers, both locally and overseas, at the branch headquarters 
within a given period of time. This would promote local learning by doing and should 
provide a group of experts to continue operations, should the multinational corporations 
migrate to other destinations.
19 See Willmore, L., (1994), “Export Processing in Jamaica”, ECLAC Port of Spain.
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The Economist of 27 June 1998, for example, suggested that the United States 
Silicon Valley culture of innovation and enterprise has been repeated in Chinese 
industrial areas, such as Shenzhen Province. The moving force behind this has been the 
ability of local firms such as Huawei Technologies, a telecommunications equipment 
maker to adapt and improve on foreign technology. Although Caribbean conditions are 
not identical to those of China, regional manufacturers can also benefit from similar kinds 
of innovation and adaptation of technology.
VIc. Areas of specialization
Manufacturers need to seek out opportunities in the high value added segments of 
the production chain. Industry in the region has focused for too long on the simple, low 
value added activities at the lower end of the value chain. This was linked to 
specialization based on the use of cheap labour. These forms of specialization are no 
longer viable. There is no good reason why regional manufacturers and agro-processors 
cannot produce higher value added products. In many cases what is required is 
resourcefulness and creativity. A number of manufacturers can produce high quality, 
differentiated goods by improving work organization, management and training, 
obtaining high quality inputs and establishing a quality assurance and management 
system. There is need for better inventory and production management, especially in the 
electronics and small machines subsectors to reduce the number of defective products to 
international best practice standards.
With some necessary changes, regional agro-processors should be able to capture 
suitable niche markets for high quality fruit beverages, condiments and herbal extracts. 
There are also good market prospects for fish processing, and furniture making in 
Guyana, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Dominica. There is little value added in 
the ‘fisheries' industry in Guyana. There is no fish canning or large scale processing of 
fillet fish or pre-cooked fish products. However, these are some of the high cost products 
in the industry. In furniture making, the use of standardized high quality raw wood, 
better machinery, improved plant layout and upgrading the skills of the labour force, 
could enable the production of high quality furniture. This is particularly so for Guyana 
with its exotic greenheart and purple heart woods.
VId. Industrial and trade  policy
Industrial and trade policy must be simple and clearly articulated. Generally, 
governments should avoid picking winners or promoting national champions. Investment 
in specific activities is best left to the entrepreneur. Governments with the limited 
resources available should focus on functional policies aimed at providing top quality 
infrastructure (transport, utilities, etc), strengthening education and training, especially 
the link between research and development institutes and the work place. The quality and 
timeliness of manufacturing extension services also needs to be improved. 
Manufacturers and agro-processors in all sectors can benefit from such policies, not just a 
selected few.
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Governments should also promote horizontal policies that entail the development 
of generic technology, managerial and marketing systems to assist manufacturers in 
broad sectors.20 A vital area for strengthening the sector concerns linkages among firms. 
As Michael Porter21 suggests, linkages among firms lead to virtuous clusters of 
development. These enable manufacturers to benefit from the comparative strength of 
each other. Manufacturers need to form regional clusters for joint purchase of plant and 
equipment, joint financing arrangements and for contracting managerial, insurance and 
marketing services. Indeed these joint arrangements could permit economies of scale 
which are not otherwise gained by individual small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), such as those of the Caribbean.
The generally weak competitive ability of regional manufacturers and agro­
processors means that government assistance at the level of the firm is necessary. 
Producers could benefit from technical assistance to improve plant layout and work-flow 
and training of the work force. A mechanism for sharing the costs of international 
product certification, such as International Standards Organisation ISO 9000 and 14000, 
would also be beneficial. Government’s industrial policy must provide clear guidelines 
on the types and extent of assistance that can be provided to firms. Moreover, 
performance criteria and targets must be established (for example, percentage increase in 
exports, revenue and employment generation), for continued access to assistance. In the 
area of marketing, government could assist in the promotion of manufactured goods to 
take advantage of potential positive externalities.
VIe. Financing
Most of the firms visited in the country case studies, stated that the access to, cost 
and terms of finance were major problems. This problem results partly from an 
imperfect, oligopolistic financial market that provides risk capital only at penal rates of 
interest and under harsh terms. It is, therefore, recommended that development finance 
institutions (Development Banks, National Development Funds [NDFs], etc) be 
streamlined and better funded to provide soft financing for the sectors. Governments 
should attempt to tap into soft enterprise development resources available from the World 
Bank and other agencies and support these with counterpart funds. Further, since SMEs 
are at a particular disadvantage due to weak collateral security and lack of reputation in 
the market, some forms of finance may have to be configured to their needs. Adequate 
channels of risk capital are needed for SMEs, for example, venture capital, merchant 
bank funds and development funds. The venture capital institution should be ably 
supported by equity capital through a dynamic stock exchange. In this regard, there is 
need for governments and the private sector to actively pursue the development of a 
regional stock exchange with new company listings and active trading of shares. The 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank’s (ECCB) plans, to develop an OECS-wide stock
20 See Sanjaya, Lall, “Market-Stimulating Technology policies in Developing Countries: A 
Framework with examples from East Asia”, World Development Vol. 26 No. 8, pp. 1369-1385, 1998.
21 Michael Porter: op cit., p.
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exchange and Venture Capital Fund, for example, should ease the financial difficulties of 
manufacturers in the OECS.
VIf. M acroeconomic policies 
VIf.1 Fiscal and m onetary policies
Relevant and consistent policies must be implemented to boost domestic 
savings and investment. Savings by manufacturers and agro-processors are particularly 
important, since they are likely to be re-invested in the enterprises. Two crucial factors 
influencing saving are interest rates and tax policies. There is a need for changes in these 
policies to boost savings that could be channeled into manufacturing production. Interest 
rates are estimated to be generally high in the Caribbean and tend to discourage 
investment in the manufacturing sector. In Guyana and Jamaica, for example, 
manufacturers faced interest rates of 20 to 30 per cent and 29 to 30 per cent, respectively. 
Many manufacturers visited said that the high cost of borrowing was a significant 
constraint on industrial start ups and plant maintenance.
Small manufacturers and agro-processors are also affected by limited 
collateral security and high reputational risks. Further, even after the plant is up and 
running, lack of access to working capital constrains day-to-day operations. This 
problem is particularly severe for SMEs that usually have locked up most or all of their 
savings in the enterprise. As indicated by Green and Villanueva22, investors in 
developing countries must save and build up money balances to invest because of their 
limited access to credit and equity markets. In fact in the countries surveyed, many of 
these small manufacturers and agro-processors noted that they were barely operating on a 
day to day basis. High cost of finance should be addressed through a lowering of the 
interest rate consistent with stable and competitive exchange rates. In this context, 
policies to keep inflation at low levels is necessary to ensure that the returns on financial 
savings remain positive. Also, more competition in the banking sector is necessary to 
increase its efficiency.
There is a need for policies to make the investment climate more 
attractive. These include demand management to control inflation, which acts as a tax on 
the profitability of investment. Policies must encourage manufacturers to use available 
savings for investment projects. This is important since the availability of savings does 
not necessarily lead to investment. A number of factors prevent a smooth link between 
savings and investment. Important among these are high real lending interest rates, a lack 
of entrepreneurial projects and unduly high collateral requirements. Commercial banks 
must be encouraged to reduce lending rates.
Tax competition is now an important tool in the competitive strategy of 
nations. Governments should examine the scope for reducing corporation tax rates to
22 Green, J. and D. Villanueva, (1991), “Private Investment in Developing Countries: An Empirical
Analysis”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol.38, No. 1.
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increase the retained earnings available to manufacturers for productive investment. Tax 
changes would have to be a part of an overall strategy of tax reform including, for 
instance, reduction in trade taxes and the introduction of an appropriate VAT. This might 
be particularly relevant for the OECS countries where trade taxes represent more than 50 
per cent of total tax revenue in all the countries.
VIf.2 The exchange rate
Recommendations on the use of exchange rate policy to aid manufacturing 
competitiveness are difficult because the regimes vary among the countries. In the OECS 
countries which operate a fixed peg to the United States dollar of EC2.70=1$US, it is 
possible that a devaluation of the currency could benefit tradable goods and services, 
such as export manufacturing, by improving price competitiveness. The potential adverse 
effects of this devaluation, however, in terms of higher inflation and domestic prices of 
imported inputs, could offset the potential competitiveness and terms of trade benefits. It 
is, therefore, advisable for these countries to continue their policy of maintaining their 
fixed exchange rate and to make macroeconomic policies work harder to promote 
competitiveness (REER for the OECS and other countries are attached as Annex 1). 
Such policies include tripartite arrangements to ensure sustainable wage increases that are 
matched by productivity growth. Also, the supply of ‘inputs’, such as finance, electricity 
and telecommunications, should be competitively priced. These polices should help to 
control the cost of operations, thereby enhancing the competitive position of 
manufacturers.
In Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Jamaica flexible exchange rate 
regimes mean that timely devaluation could boost the price competitiveness of 
manufactured exports. In fact, the devaluation of the 1980s and 1990s supported by more 
competitive input costs contributed to the growth in non-petroleum manufacturing 
exports in Trinidad and Tobago. Unfortunately, the manufacturing sector in Guyana and 
Jamaica did not benefit much from the devaluation of the 1990s. This was probably 
because any gains in price competitiveness were swamped by high production costs and 
relatively low quality production. To be beneficial, devaluation must be supported by 
strategies to strengthen productivity.
VIg. E ntrepreneurship
A vital, but difficult, area that requires a creative approach is the stimulation of 
entrepreneurship. Caribbean societies are fairly risk averse and this is manifested in the 
reluctance of current producers to venture into export markets and the shortage of new 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs respond to incentives and there is a need for practical 
changes in policy to boost entrepreneurship. Useful policies include competition policy to 
encourage entry into and exit from manufacturing activities, protection of property rights 
and regulation of contracts, competitive prices to facilitate investment in new technology 
and adequate public investment in infrastructure and training of the work force. 
Entrepreneurship, though, is driven by more than good macroeconomic policies. In a real 
sense, cultural and institutional factors are important influences on the entrepreneurial 
spirit of a society. Therefore, the promotion of a culture of excellence and a positive
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attitude towards risk-taking, supported by suitable rewards, could facilitate 
entrepreneurship.
VIh. H um an resource development
The acquisition of knowledge and skills needs to be promoted by government and 
private sector policies. Governments must lead the way by providing systems of primary, 
secondary and tertiary liberal and technical education. Manufacturers, on the other hand, 
need to develop a structured system for on-the-job training and research and development 
with science, engineering, technology and management training institutions. 
Manufacturers also need to undertake periodic inventory of the skills and performance of 
the workforce, and provide systems for retraining and upgrading workers’ skills to meet 
international best practices. Given the financial constraints, the private and public sector 
could provide training loans to workers and defer repayment until the worker is back in 
employment.
VIi. The quality of institutions
Economics Nobel Laureate Douglas North23 states that history is characterized by 
the interaction between three main elements - institutions, organizations and individuals. 
Owing to their importance, there is need for a major reform and restructuring of 
institutions that influence manufacturing competitiveness. The productivity and 
administrative efficiency of the public sector is a good starting point. Public sector 
administrative reform must provide systems for ensuring cost effective, timely and 
competent delivery of customer service. The procedures and legislation for establishing 
manufacturing enterprises must be simplified and documented to ensure transparency. 
Similarly, incentive mechanisms must be clear and impartially administered. Customs 
and other services must be streamlined to reduce unnecessary form completing and 
bureaucracy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The creation of a dynamic and competitive manufacturing sector in the 
CARICOM region is no easy task. In fact, it is an arduous task that requires a systematic 
strategy. At the core of this strategy there must be measures to address the very structure 
of the economies. Systems of production and exchange in the region are characterized by 
very imperfect markets. The countries have recourse to one of two approaches. Either 
they adopt market reforms to iron out the imperfections in their markets so that these 
markets can work properly, or they can devise an ingenious strategy for promoting 
competitiveness in imperfect markets. Given the current prevalence of the market system 
world wide and the economic reforms that the region has undergone, the first approach 
might be more practical and relevant.
23 North, Douglas (1990), “Institutional Change and Economic Performance,” New York, 
Cambridge University Press.
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Structural market reforms to promote manufacturing competitiveness must 
include some key ingredients. These include, first, policies and incentives to boost new 
and productive manufacturing investment. The problem here is that current price, cost 
and profit margin incentives promote trading activities (such as the buying and selling of 
household goods and consumer durables), and real estate development, rather than 
manufacturing activities. This is a policy relic of the import substitution era, when policy 
incentives favoured rent seeking trading concerns in uncompetitive markets. To address 
this problem, financial markets must be made more open and competitive, through 
policies to facilitate market entry and exit. Commercial and development banks must be 
provided with appropriate incentives to make available longer-term finance for 
potentially viable manufacturing activities - through lower central bank discount rates, for 
example, in the case of commercial banks, where appropriate. Interest rates should also 
be liberalized to provide true signals of the cost and availability of credit.
In addition, macroeconomic policy reforms which foster domestic and import 
competition must be strengthened. Such reforms improve the attractiveness of the 
domestic business environment for growth inducing foreign direct investment and reduce 
the incentives for rent-seeking ‘hot’ capital inflows. Moreover, businesses will need to 
optimize the benefits of information and communications technology. Better use could 
be made of the technology to compare equipment and material supplies prices, market 
intelligence, consumer requirements and standards and for networking among 
manufacturers, suppliers and consumers.
Human resource development must be brought in line with the demands of the 
market place. This demands adequate institutions for and methods of training and 
retraining. In this respect, universities need to integrate broad generic research with 
product development and service delivery research. Also, public administration must be 
upgraded to provide quality customer service in a timely manner.
A vital issue relates to the promotion of a culture of entrepreneurship. This is a 
rather difficult area. However, lessons from economic science and human psychology 
indicate that entrepreneurs respond to appropriate incentives. Therefore, the integrated 
macroeconomic and institutional support framework should be geared to the promotion 
of manufacturing entrepreneurship.
The challenge of developing competitive manufacturing activity in CARICOM is 
a major one. It is necessary to provide a more balanced use of domestic resources and to 
diversify the economies away from dependence on primary agriculture and tourism, the 
prospects of which are both declining. Moreover, the returns from a competitive 
manufacturing sector, in terms of foreign exchange generation, growth, employment and 
improved living standards, more than outweigh the challenge.
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Annex
Real Effective Exchange Rates for Selected Countries 1985-1998













1985 129.80 291.20 164.80 112.40 121.10 120.00 116.30 86.50 104.90 153.70 457.79
1986 116.10 276.20 114.00 104.90 116.90 112.80 114.40 108.60 97.00 124.30 134.93
1987 107.70 142.20 105.60 100.60 109.70 110.70 109.10 113.20 99.10 108.80 118.24
1988 106.40 179.20 99.10 100.10 102.60 103.60 102.40 118.60 106.30 102.40 100.00
1989 106.20 140.70 97.80 101.20 107.50 105.80 102.40 111.20 100.30 106.50 104.47
1990 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 102.46
1991 101.30 85.40 100.38 100.90 99.54 102.20 102.10 107.00 103.20 97.50 104.47
1992 99.20 93.80 102.44 100.70 98.23 102.90 100.60 111.60 100.00 95.00 102.36
1993 101.50 102.10 92.36 105.10 101.00 106.90 107.40 135.40 92.90 97.60 100.54
1994 96.90 100.90 85.34 105.90 100.97 106.30 104.20 144.50 92.80 96.40 93.26
1995 94.60 102.60 83.58 104.00 98.84 105.10 99.10 150.20 87.50 90.80 90.14
1996 99.70 110.90 85.22 105.00 99.65 105.60 103.40 126.10 90.60 96.00 95.36
1997 102.80 116.90 84.45 105.40 108.02 108.10 107.00 119.33 110.10 104.50 99.20
1998 104.00 121.75 87.74 107.50 111.39 109.65 112.00 77.70 120.85 112.40 105.03
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)
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